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Stylistic iconicity and Love's two orders of language 
 
Michael Toolan 
  
 
 
My aim here is to put integrationism’s anti-systematicity into close conjunction with 
stylistics’ craving for linguistic explanation of literary effects, to see whether any kind of 
rapprochement, even of conceptual inclusion of the latter within the former, is remotely 
possible—or whether such an effort only highlights the mutual incompatibility of the two 
mind-sets.  Love’s idea of two orders of language activity helps to focus the difficulties.  
Applying these to the practice and principles of stylistics, they prompt several basic 
questions: Is stylistics doomed to the adoption of one ‘second order’ descriptive machine 
after another, in a futile effort to capture the essence, the life, of the literary texts it analyses? 
Are readers’ actual engagements with poems, their ‘first order’ experiencing of poems, 
never to be satisfactorily or usefully explained by these abstracting, unit-manipulating, 
second-order systems?  In moving towards answers to these questions I will suggest that  
stylisticians are not unaware of their difficulties (sometimes more aware than other linguistic 
analysts of texts), and that one concept that some have adopted as part of an effort to forge a 
strong connection from the second-order description back to the first-order experience, is 
that of iconicity.  I discuss whether ‘iconicity’ is stylistics’ attempt to bridge the second-
order/first-order gulf. 
 
1. Integrationism and Literature 
 
Few integrationists have much to say about literature, perhaps regarding it as a specialist 
interest of the educationally privileged in modern societies—writers and readers-- whose 
outpourings have already received a disproportionate amount of linguists’ attention.  
Certainly the 1066-and-all-that history of linguistics describes European philologers 
devoting much energy to linguistic analysis of each language’s literary canon studied 
diachronically, and minimal attention to contemporary speech and its synchronic 
systematicity.  Then came Saussure and Boas, the revaluation of now mechanically-
recordable speech, and a general turning away from regarding language-study and linguistics 
as having much centrally to do with literature, or vice versa.  After all, everybody uses 
language every waking hour in all sorts of complex ways, and many do so without reading a 
word of literature, so the latter is clearly a linguistically peripheral cultural practice. 
That, to my mind, is only part of the story.  Another part would argue that Literature 
is modernity’s religion of the book (it also often provides a good test for linguists’ theories).  
For a significant proportion of literate people in western societies especially, and since the 
early 19
th
 century mostly, spiritual guidance, self-understanding, explanation of what makes 
for a thoughtful, compassionate, ethical co-existence with all other creatures on the planet, 
has come as much, if not more, from their literary reading than from their reading of the 
Bible, the Torah, the Koran, or other holy scriptures.  It is not clear to me that literature is 
still, in the 21
st
 century, the primary spiritual guide for modernity’s adherents—arguably 
songs to some extent and films especially, in various forms, have taken over the primary 
position.  But by films here I mean narrative films--films that tell stories and almost 
invariably include language in the telling, most prominently in characters’ speech.  
Narratives that use language (many do not) are arguably the master form, when people look 
for guidance and understanding.  Notwithstanding the richness and subtlety of ideas that 
language-free film or music or visual art can prompt in recipients, literature retains its own 
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distinct position, by virtue of the complexity of the articulated situations it can convey 
through language.   
From the era of structural linguistics onwards, most academic linguists in the West 
have had little or no interest in literature (with a few notable and not-entirely-mainstream 
exceptions, such as Jakobson, Kiparsky, Halliday, and Hymes), on the grounds that literature 
is remote from ‘ordinary language’, the canonical speech situation, and the mysteries of 
language acquisition by infants.  The art in literary language, and literary culture as a whole, 
was implicitly judged by mainstream linguistics to be ‘artificial’, cultural rather than natural, 
of doubtful authenticity, often ‘contrived’, and absolutely the wrong place to look to observe 
the workings of ordinary language in its basic functions.  If linguists analysed poems at all, 
there was a tendency to emphasize that each poem was sui generis, and related obliquely to 
the rules and units of ordinary language; for a while some generative linguists like Thorne 
proposed that each new poem had its own distinct language and grammar. But among those 
linguists who did explore poetics, such as Jakobson and Thorne, iconicity is often an at least 
implicit criterion of explanation. 
Integrational linguists may have neglected literary texts just as much as mainstream 
linguistics did, but for a different reason: how can there be any great ‘conveyed complexity’ 
in literary texts, worthy of analysis, if in line with the freedom of the sign-making individual 
that integrational semiology asserts, every different recipient is entitled to their own unique 
understanding of any given text, any purportedly artistic communicative act?  But that 
theoretical principle applies to all texts and communicative events, and not exceptionally to 
poems.  Nor should it be treated as licensing widespread communicational 
misunderstanding, but a more nuanced model of communicational accord, involving 
context-shaped coordination of words and acts.  No-one writes a book like the Language 
Myth, urging a demythologized and redefined linguistics, with the expectation that every 
reader will make sense of it so differently from their fellow-readers that all mutual 
understanding is lost—least of all Roy Harris. 
Integrational linguistics could have been among the last to accept the exiling of 
literature from the attention of linguists, since literature is arguably a best exemplar of its 
central claims.  Where two or three gather together to read and discuss their reactions to a 
poem that is new to them, the experience will be palpably remote from what the language 
myth promises: no smooth mind-to-mind transfer of ideas, no rapid and uniform matching of 
forms to meanings, and no great certainty as to an agreed understanding at all. 
Integrational semiology says all meaning, all sign-making and sign-interpreting is 
‘now’ (not necessarily the same ‘now’ for all parties: I can leave some sticks on the beach in 
a particular configuration one evening, with a view to you seeing and ‘reading’ them the next 
morning).  In a sense, with regard to meaning and communication, integrationists are always 
saying ‘you had to have been there’ (to ‘get’ what was signified by and for the parties 
involved).   
On the other hand there is something we must set beside or against readers’ 
integrationism-warranted diversity of interpretations (sometimes an unmanageable 
diversity—but then, why value ‘manageability’?): it is the fact that poets and stylisticians are 
no less immune to seduction by the language myth of fixed-code telementation than anyone 
else.  I suspect that we stylisticians, negotiating a kind of repression, intermittently simply 
know that linguistic communication—a poem, say—cannot possibly be based upon a fixed 
code of form-meaning pairs known or knowable by all.  But craving the permanent and 
enduring, something that transcends the ephemeral moment and the never-to-be-recovered 
individual context, we contrive to explain what we see as the main enduring or promising-to-
endure meanings and significance of specific linguistic communications (poems, and extracts 
from novels and plays), on the grounds that these are one kind of consolation—defiance 
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even—of the variability, indeterminacy, entropy, dissolving, and death, which we also know 
to be the case.  And in that yearning for the permanent text, the promise made by the idea of 
iconicity in literature is seductive.  It proposes that, for these particular language events, there 
is no specific ‘there’: as long as you are English-proficient, you can read a Shakespeare 
sonnet at any time, in any place, and some of the experience or meaning of the poem will (or 
should) be yours, whatever the contextual circumstances, because iconicity claims a natural 
fit between form and meaning.  The inescapable test case, especially in the 400
th
 anniversary 
of his death, is Shakespeare--for example, his sonnet #55:   
 
Not marble, nor the gilded monuments 
Of princes, shall outlive this powerful rhyme; 
But you shall shine more bright in these contents 
Than unswept stone besmear'd with sluttish time. 
When wasteful war shall statues overturn, 
And broils root out the work of masonry, 
Nor Mars his sword nor war's quick fire shall burn 
The living record of your memory. 
'Gainst death and all-oblivious enmity 
Shall you pace forth; your praise shall still find room 
Even in the eyes of all posterity 
That wear this world out to the ending doom. 
So, till the judgment that yourself arise, 
You live in this, and dwell in lovers' eyes. 
 
 
2. Love’s two orders of language activity 
 
Nigel Love’s 1990 distinction between first order and second order language activity excited 
me when I was writing Total Speech (1996), and it is no less stimulating an idea to me now.  
He begins (1990: 96) with Bloomfield’s “fundamental assumption of linguistics” (1935: 144), 
that for some speech community or other, some utterances are alike as to form and meaning, 
thus allowing the beginnings of a system of repeated signs to be thinkable.  Without  such 
recurrent ‘sames’, ordinary linguistics would not seem possible at all.  But the assumption 
itself is magic wand-waving by the theoretician, Love suggests, and Bloomfield made no 
attempt to provide evidential support for it—instead by implication he treats orthographic 
writing as the terra firma justifying the assumption.  If I write Odense is rainy  and you write 
Odense is rainy these are said to be alike as to form and meaning, notwithstanding 
differences of handwriting, ink, surface, what have you.  How do we know?  Because they 
are written the same, and anyone who reads one aloud will make much the same sounds as 
when reading the other aloud.  In short, the circularity or question-begging is (incompletely) 
masked by writing, or what writing seems to entail. 
Love further suggests that the making of a distinction between types and tokens is a 
necessary condition of ‘generalizing discourse’ about anything, and that “this capacity of 
language to facilitate generalizing talk about the world is unremarkable” (97).  What he 
intends here—I believe—is not any claim about the ‘necessity’ of a philosophical explanation 
in terms of tokens and types, but about the interdependence, without priority, of several ideas: 
perceptions of sameness; performing a sameness (e.g. saying or writing what you regard as 
the same thing again); abstraction; and generalization.  Any one of these entails the others.  
But we have no grounds for assuming that our abstraction, our sorting of instances into types, 
is itself identical to that of others. We use this capacity to treat utterances as if they were 
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recurrent variant instances of underlying invariants all the time in linguistic communication.  
The mistake, Love suggests, is to assume uniformity among all speakers in a speech 
community, as to what count as instances and underlying invariants.  At several points Love 
argues that the problem is not with the idea of abstraction itself, of individual communicators 
devising a cognitive categorization of the utterances they encounter or produce.  The problem 
is with any assumption that this abstracting operates on a unified, determinate, homogeneous 
substrate: “The problem is not the idea of abstractions underlying speech, but the idea of 
determinate systems of abstraction underlying speech” (Love 1990: 108)  The world is not the 
same for everyone, not has ever been. 
First-order linguistic communication is the use of language to communicate 
(informing that use with your past linguistic, indeed interactional, experience or history, 
mostly spontaneously and unreflectingly).  It is a ‘doing’; it can be minimally self-conscious, 
and is often so in the very young, those suffering from dementia, the rest of us in moments of 
emotional extremity, and perhaps, sometimes, in self-communication. Second-order linguistic 
communication comprises every kind of articulated reflection upon first-order linguistic 
communication, and particularly the verbal parts of it.  It assumes and exploits self-
consciousness, reflexivity, our powers of memory and our ability to treat temporally 
discontinuous material as repetitions and parts of a pattern. It also assumes our powers of 
imaginative projection: we can, vividly enough, imagine ourselves stepping out of the on-
flowing river of life to appear to stop living now, while we ponder and report on what we or 
someone else said then. So second-order linguistic communication is metalinguistic activity 
of all kinds.  But is this metalinguistic activity exclusively second-order?  No.  I cannot deny 
that even in maximally ‘engaged’, minimally reflexive first-order language-using activity, we 
still find speakers using kinds of metalanguage, albeit more evaluatively than analytically 
(e.g. when they say someone is a smooth talker or uses filthy language or sounds angry all the 
time). 
I therefore do not find the ‘two orders’ distinction unproblematic.  In particular it is 
quite hard to recognize a ‘first-order’ use of language that is utterly devoid of the proposed 
defining features of second-order language communication (and, perhaps, vice versa too).  
Thus in a recent commentary on the distinction sent to all participants prior to the Odense 
Symposium, Love says that in first-order communication the speaker has to creatively deploy 
parts of their past experience to maximise likelihood of communicative success, and the 
hearer is supposed to ‘do their best’ to understand the speaker.  But for a hearer to ‘do their 
best’ seems to imply some comparative self-assessment on their part, a comparing of their 
current effort with alternative qualities of effort, which looks very much like a second-order 
activity.  Likewise the speaker’s task of selecting clues from past experience also suggests a 
kind of second-order detached reflection upon both present and past communicational 
activity.  
While sometimes (or even always) difficult to maintain, the ‘two orders’ distinction is 
also useful—a usefully extreme encapsulation of two quite different ways of thinking about 
and using language, which might be summarized, again in extremis, as the ordinary person’s 
approach to language (full integration) and the academic linguistician’s approach to it (at 
least partial segregation).  At the very least, Love is arguing that we need to be attentive to 
the differences between the two orders, and to beware of presuming that a commentary 
couched in the terms of the second-order will necessarily yield insights into the workings of 
linguistic communication in the first-order.  I am assuming also that a redefined linguistics of 
an integrationist or related kind would hope to clarify the relations between the second and 
first orders, and make second-order academic linguists more responsive to, more engaged 
with, first-order activity.  Whether that is a matter of building bridges between the two, or 
contriving a merger (an absolute separation would be a policy of despair, presumably) is less 
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clear to me. 
Some of the thinking that developed into the idea of two orders of language activity 
are detectable, I believe, in an earlier paper critiquing the fixed-code theory (Love 1985).  
There, Love uses the variant pronunciations of postmen, the philosophers’ complicated 
attempts to explain the allegedly paradoxical nature of negative existential sentences, and 
variable informant responses about the propositional entailments of sentences like my son 
threw a brick at the window, to make the point that these are linguists’ language-games where 
various moves (objections, reformulations) are allowed but where there is a limit, a point 
where you are deemed no longer to be playing the game.  At that point you are ‘cheating’ 
(Palmer), beyond the pale, not doing linguistics.  Such ‘cheating’ might prompt the rhetorical 
question Is nothing sacred? (with its own negative existential)—because in the language 
games of orthodox linguistics something certainly is sacred, and that is the commitment to 
the idea of unambiguous form-meaning pairings as the foundation of a language system.  
Holding that principle sacrosanct, the linguist game-player will have no time for Love’s 
observations with regard to the variability of propositional entailments depending on the 
communicational needs on a particular occasion of use.  Implicit in orthodox linguistics’ 
disallowing of ‘beyond-the-pale examples’, I believe, is a sharply circumscribed conception 
of first-order language activity, upon which (and only upon which), linguists’ sophisticated 
second-order analytical machinery can reliably work.  The segregational linguist will dismiss, 
as ‘cheating’, the idea that “the relation between propositions and the forms of words that 
express them is not such that the former can be read off directly, in the absence of any 
context of utterance, from the latter” (1985: 3).  Because the orthodox linguist is so firmly 
committed to the describing of a fixed code pairing of abstraction conceived of as forms and 
meanings (for thought-communication) “our inability to say precisely what might be 
communicated by my son threw a brick at the window is taken as no hindrance to the 
enterprise of determining, in the abstract, the meaning of that expression”  (1985: 5-6).  
Actual communicational practices using language are held at some distance from this 
idealising and arguably misrepresenting endeavour. 
One of the important things that Love’s first order/second order naming achieves is to 
make clear that the systematisation of verbal communication into something conceived of as 
a language with a set of items and rules for their combination (what I’ve called the 
codification impulse) comes after, or second.  Orthodox linguistics has managed to induce 
many to believe that the order is exactly the reverse, and the terminology of system and 
instantiation aids in that misrepresentation, as do the many game and dance analogies.  First 
you have chess with all its rules, and then you have a rich ‘creative’ variety of possible legal 
moves that follow those rules (and if you devise a board game with 36 squares and no knights 
then you’re not playing chess at all, so, again, beyond the pale). 
Love suggests that perhaps the most primitive manifestation of our decontextualising 
ability, our ability to move to the second order of language activity, is displayed by our 
capacity to respond to the metalinguistic question “What did you say?”—or, I would add, 
“What did they say?”.  Any non-literate person who asks either of these questions has a 
concept of ‘sayings’, of sequences of oral sounds understood to play an important role in the 
expression of currently relevant meanings, sequences sufficiently object-like that speaker and 
addressee can try to orient to them and inspect them.  Love pinpoints the metalinguistic 
question as evidence of the language-user’s grasp of the possibility of contextually-relevant 
repetition.  For me, it is equally important as evidence of a kind of intersubjective faith: a 
trust that it is possible, to all important intents and purposes, for someone to replay now and 
here what someone said far away and long ago. In this replaying, this reported speech, there 
is no identifying of a linguistic unit, let alone an identical linguistic unit.  In reported speech 
something “relevantly similar”, to use Love’s formulation, is surely all that interactants who 
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trust in the possibility of it expect.  Elsewhere (1990: 98), Love suggests that when A asks for 
an exact repetition from B, the judgement that B’s second effort is an exact repeat is 
grounded in no transcending abstract scheme, no autonomous system, nothing beyond 
situation-internal conformity with the idea that it is, in all the interactional circumstances, a 
valid repeat.  Even to me, carrying the integrationist virus (Owen nnnn), this kind of non-
explanation feels like the sort of hand-waving that most linguists find exasperating; but 
laying claim to any more determinate basis for sorting the repetitions from the variations is 
arguably to descend into scientism.  Besides, it is surely no accident that only in legal and 
other quarrelsome situations that ideas of verbatim reporting, of X saying ‘exactly’ what Y 
said, come to the fore; and even these never really cease being a kind of loose talk (to use 
relevance theory’s useful concept), a context-specific acceptance that such and such will 
count as ‘an exact repetition’ of some previous formulation. The looseness begins with the 
indeterminacy as to what verbatim or faithful themselves mean. 
“What did you just say?” and “What did they say?”, and the possibility of giving 
answers to such questions, encapsulate metalinguistics, or second-order language activity and 
thinking, in the most compelling way.  They invite us to imagine a language-using world 
where such questions are missing.  (They are absent from Wittgenstein’s four-term builder’s 
language, of Block!, Slab! etc.,--but that is an implausibly reduced language.)  I cannot 
imagine that such a world would not also lack questions like “‘What happened?” and “What 
did you just do?”, so “What did you say?” is an integral aspect of our capacity for partially 
removing ourselves from the present flow of experience to the point that we temporarily 
focus upon spatiotemporally removed activity, and put current activity in the background. It 
is what deixis is all about (deixis suitably broadly conceived being, in my opinion, what the 
final chapter of The Language Myth is also all about).  We cannot, however, escape that 
embeddedness in the spatiotemporal present, as Harris’s concept of cotemporality 
emphasises. 
Just as ‘what did you say’? is the canonical metalinguistic question, the very idea of 
reported speech lies at the heart of linguistics; furthermore, in one form or another, it is a 
generator of endless papers and theorising in narratology and cognitive poetics—e.g. Text 
World Theory (see, e.g., Werth 1999, Gavins 2007), just one of several attempts to develop a 
deictic or perspectival model of the way stories can be embedded within stories recursively, 
giving rise to complex interpretive tasks for the reader, assessing the varying reliability of 
narrators at different levels of embeddedness. In short and in essence, the problem of hearsay 
evidence.  You heard that X said Y but you didn’t yourself hear X say Y, did you?  More 
complex yet than the literary representation of bog standard direct speech and indirect speech 
is that written discourse which has many of the formal characteristics of indirect speech (e.g. 
past tense, 3
rd
 person pronouns) but when read aloud nevertheless ‘sounds’ like a direct 
voicing of a character’s words or thoughts: a discourse presentational format that ‘cheats’, 
going beyond the pale of grammatical direct and indirect discourse.  No topic is dearer to the 
hearts of narratologists and novel criticism than such Free Indirect Style (to give one of its 
myriad names), a sophisticated literacy mutation of the reported speech genus, raising 
difficult questions for the reader about quite whose judgements (the narrator’s or a 
character’s?) are being presented, as from what time, and in what place. 
In the stylistic analysis of literature, there is a powerful wish to describe or identify, if 
possible, the abstract linguistic systems that underlie the poem or style under scrutiny and to 
try to persuade others that they too, if they do enough second-order reflection upon their first 
order experience of the poem, must agree that just these systems, these units, these forms, 
have very much the meanings that the specific stylistician proposes.  Or, making concessions 
to different readers’ racial, sexual, etc identities, stylisticians will allow some divergences in 
interpretation, but will tacitly cling to the idea of convergence, of a large and central area of 
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‘shared experience’ by virtue of stable forms triggering or containing stable meanings.  The 
alternative is too distasteful—it is the suggestion that what I take to be the forms and 
meanings of Shakespeare’s sonnet 55 might be incalculably different from what the next 
person takes that poem’s forms and meanings to be, that in fifty, ten, or five years’ time the 
view might emerge that this sonnet is as inconsequential as yesterday’s free newspaper.   To 
stylisticians it makes no sense to imagine that in a hundred years time people might agree that 
sonnet 55 is rubbish. 
 
 
3. Taylor and the politics of language 
 
In the same long ago Redefining Linguistics volume that carried Nigel Love’s paper appeared 
also Talbot Taylor’s plea that a redefined linguistics pay proper attention to the kinds of 
normativity in language that, from the perspective of the language-user, are so important.  
Normativity, socio-political pressures to conform or converge in our usage, our form-
meaning pairings and our form- and meaning-selections, are a prominent part of the ordinary 
socialised language-user’s understanding of what language is, and affects their own uses of 
language and their evaluations of others’ uses.  An integrationally redefined linguistics 
should attend to this.  A linguistics which claims to espouse pure descriptivism is failing to 
engage with “the important issues of the politics of language”, Taylor says, adding: 
From the perspective of the language-user, concepts such as ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘good’, 
and ‘correct’ (no less than ‘word’, ‘meaning’, and ‘sentence’) are necessary to an 
understanding of what a language is.  (1990: 142, italics in original) 
I would agree, but the evaluative judgements that are so important a part of understanding of 
a language for a language-user do not stop there, with ideas about good, bad, correct and 
incorrect.  What about language that gets talked about because someone deems it beautiful, or 
ugly, or forceful, or mysterious, or vivid, dynamic, transcendent, agitated first but calm later, 
dreary, clotted, stodgy, paradoxical… in fact the whole panoply of forms of judgement that 
readers normatively orient to when they feel impelled to talk about samples of language at 
all?   
It is possible that readers may not feel impelled to talk about any of the language that 
they themselves produce or that they encounter coming from others, and likewise perhaps we 
could go through life drinking various kinds of wine—the way bees suck nectar—and never 
pass any kind of reflective judgement on them.  But as Love has argued, it is hard to imagine 
anything approximating a spoken language getting under way without a concomitant 
reflexive (and often normative) set of practices of second  order commentary also developing 
in parallel.  With writing it all gets much more developed and sophisticated (on this topic, 
Teubert 2010 is an important recent contribution).  With literature, commentaries on 
literature, and those reversions to form- and meaning-analyses that claim to illuminate those 
commentaries (aka stylistics), reflexive commentary is thoroughly entrenched.  We could say 
it is unnecessary to do these things—just drink the wine, just listen to the poem—but is there 
any such thing as ‘just drinking the wine’ (would it be anything like our conception of wine if 
it was something we just drank, without speaking about it in any way?), or ‘just listening to a 
poem’, analogous to the way that we most of the time completely unawares keep breathing 
the air around us and keep hearing the ambient hum and rumble of machines and traffic 
around us?  And without reflexive and normative commentary on the quality of the wine, or 
of the air, would we be able efficiently to protect ourselves from poor or even vile wine, and 
polluted or toxic air? 
I by no means assume that there is uniformity of judgement, among readers or among 
stylisticians, as to what constitute ‘agitated sentences’ or ‘calm sentences’, any more than 
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there is uniformity of view among language-users as to what is correct or faulty grammar or 
pronunciation.  On the contrary there is divergence, claim and counter-claim, and an ongoing 
conversation: this is part of what makes these questions sites both of normativity and cultural 
interest.  In stylistics I have always argued that the practitioner is aiming, by the rhetoric of 
their deployment of linguistically-formulated evidence, to persuade others that this matrix of 
formal features, in this assessment of the entextualised situation, is likely to have created in 
the reader and likely to create in future readers such and such effects (meaning, interpretation, 
signification) on the balance of probabilities.  Any higher standard, such as certainty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, is incongruent with the theoretical assumptions made so far.  The 
stylistician is always making a (civil) case, not delivering a proof; they are always making a 
normative claim, if you like, and norms change thank God, so stylistic analyses of 
Shakespeare will never conclude, final solutions as to his sonnets’ meanings will never be 
reached (this clearly creates a tension with iconicity’s claims of natural and enduring form-
meaning ‘fit’).  They are also always functioning as a first-person reporter on their own 
linguistic experience of the poem--who else’s could they truly reliably report?—or of others’ 
reported experiences of the poem. 
By the same token, if I accept that a redefined linguistics must recognize that how 
language-users make language significant (sc., how they attribute or impose form upon its 
substance) is contingent upon the individuality of person and situation (in Taylor’s words: 
1990: 143), nevertheless the wish of the stylistician is to believe that for this poem or that 
play, the individualities of person and situation on the production or the reception side are 
attenuated or transcended.  Thus the stylistician’s wish is that the form of literary works and 
the addressee experiences they provide were comparatively permanent or stable, albeit within 
a world where all linguistic form is situation-dependent and variable.  Nor, another 
qualification, is the stylistician entitled to assume that the literary critical assessments 
(menacing, agitated, calm, dynamic), invoked as the reader responses for which the linguistic 
commentaries purport to be a causal explanation, are themselves stable, transparent, and 
determinate in meaning.  On the contrary, they too are inevitably contingent and 
impermanent, and some will wax others wane with change of time and place, in terms of 
prominence in the literary stylistic conversation:  consider the changing fortunes of critical 
terms such as racist, gendered, sentimental, muscular, tone-deaf. 
One of the things integrationism dislikes about the practices of stylisticians are those 
points in their books and articles where they claim to explain the meaning of some form, as if 
the identification of the form and of the meaning and indeed the explanation were not just 
good for the writer themselves but for readers in general, and for all time.  Of course 
stylisticians’ explanations, given integrationism’s situationism, cannot be of such an absolute 
kind.  But it is worth noting how different are the terms of engagement when someone 
attempts a stylistic analysis of a Shakespeare sonnet, by comparison with the canonical 
situation of linguistic communication within which most integrationist examples are 
discussed, highlighting the situation-embedded coordination of meanings which might be 
called the normal practice.  In two important ways, the sonnet-analysis is different.  First, 
while the substance to be interpreted is writing, it is mostly writing that we understand is a 
script for what actually needs to be spoken, performed (all the attention to rhyme, assonance 
and intonation would make no sense otherwise): it is hard to think of another culturally-
entrenched linguistic activity which hovers quite so ambivalently between the categories of 
speech and writing.  Second, it is understood to be composed by one but intended to be read 
by many; and the ‘one’ here is not any old one, but the greatest of verbal artists. 
 
 
4. The importance of literature, iconicity, and creative ‘fit’ 
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I want to return to the ‘Is nothing sacred?’ rhetorical question, which I mentioned earlier in 
relation to Nigel Love’s 1985 commentary on those language games that are permitted, and 
those that are not, within the fixed-code paradigm.  It is a question of enormous resonance.  It 
was invoked, with obvious irony, by Salman Rushdie also in the 1980s, when some of the 
wordings in his Satanic Verses were deemed by some to be so wicked that a death-sentence 
was passed on him.  But in the predominantly secular Britain of the late 20
th
 century, the 
years of Derrida and Dawkin but really a zeitgeist that reached back to Darwin and the 19
th
 
century rise of scientific explanation, the prospect arose, and is embraced by integrationism, 
that nothing linguistic is sacred.  More specifically, nothing verbal or linguistic is, by virtue 
of its specific wording in such and such a context of situation, guaranteed to signify in some 
particular predetermined way.  No meaning, whether deemed banal and everyday or 
transcendent and transformative, can be predeterminately assigned to some specifiable extent 
of linguistic form, and guaranteed as good over time and across a whole speech community: 
determinations as to form and meaning are ratified by language-using language-making 
participants in the course of the communicational event in which they are engaged.  There are 
ways in which the briefest reflections on our own changing lives, and on the changes we see 
in language through time and space, remind us that we know this.   We know that forms and 
meanings are constantly in process of revision, renewal, ratification or sanction, promotion or 
demotion.  But we also yearn for occasions of form-meaning permanence and exceptional 
power, transcendent language, celebrated communally as if available to all—usually written 
occasions or at least scripted-and-performed occasions.  Many once looked for these 
occasions in religious texts, tellingly called ‘scripture’ in the Christian tradition, and plenty 
still do.  Some look instead or as well to other form-meaning communicational pairings, in 
music, dance, film, and the pictorial and plastic arts. Some look to literature.  And iconicity 
discourse reflects that desire. 
The discourse of iconicity has a crucial place in the story modern stylistics tells about 
iself, alongside such ideas as foregrounding, deviation/markedness, and parallelism or 
repetition.  It is strikingly difficult to find an entirely satisfactory single defninition of what 
iconicity amounts to, for stylistic purposes (the work of Fischer, Nänny and others is 
frequently cited, however). In one set of terms or another it re-asserts a natural or logical 
connection between the form and meaning of signs, whereas modern linguistics has declared 
the connection to be purely arbitrary and conventional.  So terms like analogy, similarity, or 
resemblance are invoked: the linguistic form is said to reflect, match, enact, be mimetic of or 
proportional with, the meaning.  Sometimes the match is claimed to be between the form and 
the (real) world.  And for some (e.g., Jeffries 2010) the iconic text must have an an 
‘experiential’ effect: you don’t just read or process the iconic language in poems, you 
experience it, the experience being said to ‘fit’ the meaning, the effect that communities of 
readers agree a poem has on them. Stylisticians say there is iconicity, or that the language is 
iconic, where they can see and demonstrate a degree of calculated ‘fit’ between the sounds or 
written shapes used, or the sequences of words used, or the grammar of a whole line or 
sentence—in short, the form--and the meaning we believe the poet or writer wanted at that 
point to convey, i.e., wanted the reader to experience.  Like other discourse analysts, 
stylisticians here lean heavily on paraphrase: having sought acceptance of their paraphrase of 
the text’s meaning, they argue that the poet’s chosen forms achieve that meaning/experience 
entirely more fitly than the paraphrase. 
A famous poem involving ears of wheat may serve as an example: Seamus Heaney’s 
‘The Harvest Bow’, often read as an homage to his father.   Here is its first stanza: 
As you plaited the harvest bow  
You implicated the mellowed silence in you  
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In wheat that does not rust  
But brightens as it tightens twist by twist  
Into a knowable corona,  
A throwaway love-knot of straw.   
The stylistician’s iconicity question is roughly as follows: As we read Heaney’s poem about 
the harvest bow, the delicate decorative ‘knot’ that is tied out of a ripe bunch of wheat ears, is 
there anything curved, wound, or knotted back on itself, in the language or form (including 
the sounds), or in the grammar, that seems uncannily to fit the topic especially well?  Is the 
poem itself, as an expression of what it is about, amount to what Philip Larkin in another 
context called a ‘frail travelling coincidence’ (overtly describing a train journey, but covertly 
encapsulating his poem about the train journey: second-order morphing to become first-
order)?  Some stylisticians, some of the time, would try to persuade readers that there are 
iconicities of form, and will care a great deal more about it than about you was and I were, 
judgement and judgment, connexion and connection, and other kinds of more routine 
conformity and nonconformity. 
 In a recent article (Toolan 2015)  I tried to define ‘stylistic iconicity’:  
By ‘stylistic iconicity’, I refer to that impression of exceptional ‘embodiment’ of a 
sign’s meaning in its materiality, such that the communication seems to be a more 
direct and natural enactment of the meaning than the arbitrary and symbolic 
signification which we ordinarily look for in language (Fischer, 2014; Leech, 2008: 
114–15, 149–50).  To claim that language is being used iconically is to claim that, to 
some degree, the form embodies the meaning; linguistic iconicity is at work when the 
form evokes the meaning because it resembles (visually or aurally) the thing meant. 
As such, in (rare) cases of what we might call ‘absolute iconicity’, an addressee 
should be able to grasp the meaning without prior knowledge of the language in which 
it is carried.  
There are plenty of things in the above formulation that need adjusting, to suit integrationist 
ears, but I think there is sufficient modalizing in the account to protect it: the references to 
impression, claims, and what seems to occur.  There is an implication too that iconicity is a 
natural form-effect fit, rather than something sometimes arising from conventions and 
training; I think the implication broadly correct, but it also true that literary education may 
encourage our attending to iconic effects (stylisticians are not the only people to have noticed 
them).  In any event even stylisticians know that iconicity in poetry is rarely if ever an 
embodiment, in the linguistic form, of the meaning (the ‘embodiment’ metaphor reflects the 
same yearning for ‘real’ and certain intersubjective material contact, the thing itself and not 
just a sign or trace of the thing).  More typically iconicity is postulated where something in 
the form seems consciously chosen (by the poet using her superfine metalinguistic 
awareness) for the way it supports or enables meanings that are mostly assessed by other 
integrational means. And Leech and Short’s (2007: 195) warning against using iconicity 
claims to foist ‘private and whimsical responses’ on literary texts certainly needs to be 
attended to; still, it is the same Leech (1969, 2008) who, over many years, has recognised the 
importance of iconicity to poetics and stylistics.  “How language works ultimately cannot be 
separated from [among other things] how its users think it works”, Love wrote in 1989 (817); 
and one of the things poetry-lovers and stylisticians believe (yes, it is a conviction) is that 
they may be justified in claiming that a poem’s sound echoes the sense, or that the 
appearance on the page, the rhythm, the lineation, or the grammar are iconically matched to 
the sense, the effect as experienced by the reader.   
I have argued (Toolan 2015) that literary creativity (e.g., in a poem), while not 
demonstrably different in kind from language creativity in non-literary situations, is 
nevertheless distinctive because it is is constituted by the text’s exceptional fitness in 
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addressing some important purpose or situation of which the reader was not aware until they 
encountered it in the poem itself.  Of course the particulars of a purpose or situation described 
in a poem will be unfamiliar and ‘new’; here I am referring to the general contours of the 
poem’s purpose, as themselves new to the reader.  A new situation is matched with a new 
‘solution’, and the fitness of the latter to the former feels inspired: those, for me, are the 
components of literary creativity. 
So in answer to my own earlier question— 
Is stylistics doomed to one ‘second order’ descriptive system after another, in a futile 
effort to capture the essence, the life, of the literary text(s) it analyses? 
--my answer is that Yes, Stylistics is bound to fail if, ignoring the time-bound fluidity of 
signification, it imagines that a permanent essence of a text and a timelessly stable descriptive 
system to apply to it are coherent goals.  On the other hand, if it is accepted that in the face of 
complex and polysemous literature, discursive commentary remains useful which draws on 
linguistic terms and principles and aims to further an understanding of how and why a text is 
composed in one way rather than another, then all talk need not cease.  A non-transcendental 
stylistics, deploying various second-order linguistic descriptions while remaining alert to 
integrational semiological axioms and the Circean attractions of the language myth, continues 
to offer valid and useful commentary on how readers read and how writers write.  In its very 
provisionality it is arguably a more sophisticated sub-discipline of linguistics than some other 
more prestigious ones.   
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